China Media Project Discourse Tracker July 2024 - The Third Plenum

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Bill

CMP Discourse Tracker / July 2024

Dear Subscribers: 

In my letter to the last edition of the CMP Discourse Tracker, I talked about “framing words,” or tifa (提法), and how these specialized political terminologies are distinct from simple keywords. Before we jump into China’s official media discourse for July 2024, a colorful example of this important distinction. 

Since 2014, Xi Jinping has used the phrase “positive energy” to talk about moderating critical coverage in the media. In the CMP Dictionary, we explain that the relevant political phrases are actually “transmit positive energy to society” (传播社会正能量) and “inject positive energy” (注入正能量). These are tifa that can be found consistently in the official media, like this recent report on indoctrinating young children with the “red culture” of the CCP. 

By contrast, note the campaign billboard below, which is from a local campaign event during Taiwan’s January presidential election. The billboard shows now President William Lai and a Legislative Yuan candidate topped by the phrase: “Positive Energy to Support Taiwan” (正能量挺台灣). In this case, “positive energy” is used in the popular sense, in the casual, share-the-love manner of this recent Threads post calling on Taiwanese to generate buzz for an underrated restaurant.  

It’s a playful illustration of an important concept — that tifa are particular, and need to be carefully treated as such in researching CCP discourse. 

On to our July analysis. 

David L. Bandurski /CMP Director

Chu Yang / Editor, Discourse Tracker 

_________________ 

TOPPING THE AGENDA

Topic 1 

The Third Plenum

Traditionally, the Third Plenum has been an occasion for the CCP Politburo and the Central Committee to unveil major policy initiatives. Several have become major moments for the party and the country. In 1978, the third plenum of the 11th CCP Central Committee resolved the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution and introduced the monumental economic reform and opening-up policy of Deng Xiaoping. 

In July 2024, the Third Plenum of the 20th CCP Central Committee was held in Beijing. As a meeting that would signal the direction of China’s social and economic policies for the next five years and beyond, the Plenum drew great attention from China watchers. It also received spotlight treatment from China's state media — after all, leading public opinion according to political priorities and the political calendar is the definition of their job.

While foreign media coverage tended to stress the point that there were few if any concrete policies emerging from the Plenum, the keyword on the party agenda was clear: reform. Mentions of the phrase “reform and opening” (改革开放) tripled for the month in the People’s Daily, with a total of 187 articles using the term — rating it Tier 1 on the CMP’s 1-6 scale for keyword intensity (热度) in the CCP’s flagship newspaper (see below). Another related buzzword, “comprehensively deepening reform” (全面深化改革), jumped from 79 to 272, rocketing into Tier 1, indicating prominence within the discourse. 

To understand CCP discourse in July 2024, both “reform and opening” and “comprehensively deepening reform” are crucial political terminologies. The first, as we said above, is Deng's chief political legacy. The second, meanwhile, is a policy phrase closely associated with Xi Jinping. 

In 2013, at the Third Plenum of the 18th Central Committee, the first key plenary session over which Xi presided as General Secretary, the Party passed a hefty document called (hold on to your seats): Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on a Number of Important Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening Reform (中共中央关于全面深化改革若干重大问题的决定). The 22,000-word document covered a lot of ground, but the upshot was that Xi Jinping’s leadership had ushered in a “New Era” distinct from that of his predecessors. 

As the first Third Plenum Decision showed, Xi would waste no time in making his political mark. While outside of China’s political culture we can tend to look at such decisions and pronouncements with an eye to real advancements, concrete plans and even breakthroughs, this is not the main yardstick applied by the CCP. Of course there are programmatic elements. But as the party defines the old and the new, the focus is always on manufacturing the new myth for a new leader. This long-standing character of politics within the CCP has been especially pronounced in Xi’s time. 

Xi, you might protest, is not a new leader. Indeed. But the challenge of the authoritarian leader is to manufacture novelty. Though Xi may not be a new leader, he must nevertheless always seem so. With each five-year cycle — from the 18th to the 19th and 20th CCP Congresses, the demand for apparent novelty rises. How else can legitimacy at the top be established without an electoral mandate, and without, in these days of economic retreat, the constant appeal to rapidly rising GDP? Extravagant discourse, mobilized through a controlled media system, must do the heavy lifting. As the scholar Christian Sorace has written: “In lieu of an electoral mandate to rule, Party legitimacy requires the constant production, exaltation, and acclamation of glory.”

In building the myths and narratives of legitimacy, CCP leaders generally seek to establish continuity, connecting their gestures and plans to the political symbols of their predecessors while distinguishing and elevating themselves. In our May 2023 discourse report in cooperation with Sinocism, we analyzed how Xi attempted to build his political legacy around his distinctive push for special zone development with projects like the Xiong’an New Area and a new Shaanxi development corridor. These projects cannot simply be viewed as strategic responses to economic development needs, but must be considered also (or even primarily) as moves to emulate Deng Xiaoping’s creation of special economic zones (SEZs) in the 1980s. Back in March, during the annual “Two Sessions,” including the National People’s Congress, the official Xinhua News Agency published an article with the headline phrase “Xi Jinping the reformer.” This was an unmistakable effort to draw direct comparisons between Xi and Deng. In fact, the article said precisely that: 

Xi is regarded as another outstanding reformer in the country after Deng Xiaoping.

On July 18, the front page of the People’s Daily ran a commentary by “Zhong Yin” (仲音), an official pen name that is a homophone for “important voice” (重要声音), marking it as a reflection of the prevailing view in the central leadership. The headline of the commentary worked in the same way to build continuity between Deng’s legacy and the future under Xi’s leadership: “Carrying Forward the Great Spirit of Reform and Opening Up and Further Promoting the Comprehensive Deepening of Reform” (弘扬伟大改革开放精神 进一步推进全面深化改革). 

The July 2024 focus in official party-state media on reform, anticipating the 120th anniversary in August of the birth of Deng Xiaoping, in fact had little to do with Deng at all. We have a popular phrase in the West attributed to Sir Isaac Newton, about standing on the shoulders of giants. In the Chinese political context, the point is to put oneself on the right set of shoulders to accentuate, or exaggerate, one’s own enormity. 

In July, before the start of the Third Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee, the People's Daily ran a column entitled “New Thoughts to Lead Reform and Opening Up in the New Era” (新思想引领新时代改革开放), which summarized the initiatives and achievements in different aspects during Xi’s period, 10 of which appeared on the front page. The headlines ran as follows:

On the front page of the July 22 edition, all space was dedicated to the communique of the Plenum, Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Further Comprehensively Deepening Reform and Promoting Chinese-style Modernisation (Full-text in Chinese here). The second term in this title, “Chinese-style modernization,” sometimes also officially translated into English as “the Chinese path to modernization,” is, just as suggested above, a glory proposition, one manufactured in the year leading up to the 20th National Congress of the CCP in October 2022. It essentially re-packages the idea of Chinese exceptionalism, that under Xi Jinping the country has achieved a new model of global development distinct from that of the West [more in the CMP Dictionary]. 

Although the Decision mentioned several specific initiatives, the most noteworthy message was stressed in another Zhong Yin commentary, “Adhering to and Implementing the ‘Two Unshakables’” (坚持和落实“两个毫不动摇”), published on the front page of the July 30 edition of the People’s Daily. Another stiff CCP terminology, the “Two Unshakables” likely points in this context to an undercurrent of urgency over the state of the economy. It refers to unflagging support for the development of the state-run sector on the one hand, and support for the private sector on the other. Considering the current state of China's economy, it seems clear the central leadership hopes to inspire confidence in the market and investors. Whether this will be effective is another question.

Towards the end of the month, in order to reflect various aspects of the communique, the front page of the People's Daily ran a column for five consecutive days called, “Anchoring Modernization, Deepening Reforms” (锚定现代化 改革再深化). Installments dealt with plans for Xiong'an, the green economy, and ecological protection, all of which are closely associated in the official discourse with Xi and his political legacy. These areas are to be designated as pivotal sectors for future policy support.

While there seem to have been no breakthroughs arising from the Plenum in terms of concrete initiatives, economic issues are clearly dominating the attention of the central leadership. In July, several economic-related meetings chaired by central leaders made the front page of the CCP’s flagship newspaper.

On July 9, Premier Li Qiang (李强) met with experts and entrepreneurs on the current economic situation. On July 22, the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, which includes many prominent business people, held a session to analyze the macroeconomic situation in the first half of the year. Wang Huning (王沪宁) attended the meeting and delivered a speech in which he seems, based on the Xinhua readout, to mostly have repeated platitudes about the need to study the “spirit” of Xi’s speech to the Plenum, and the “new ideas, new perspectives, and new assertions” (新思想、新观点、新论断) the general secretary had made on the “comprehensive deepening of reforms.” Once again, the unrelenting talk of newness can clue us in to the mobilization of glory propositions. 

On the front page of the July 31 edition, almost the entire page was devoted to economic issues, and to the related issue of remedying “formalism” (形式主义) — essentially, the emphasis on pointless procedures over substantive work — in order to reduce burdens on the grassroots. This has been a constant theme in the state media this year, one we dealt with in greater detail in “Fingertip Formalism,” on the immense burden and waste created by digital governance efficiency efforts. (Since this bulletin is all about CCP discourse, we should note that Party-speak is itself a prime example of “formalism,” one the party, despite its best efforts, is incapable of eradicating.)

On the same page on July 31, the Central Committee met with non-party members on the current economic situation and economic work in the second half of the year, a meeting that was chaired by Xi Jinping. Xi emphasized, according to the Xinhua readout, that "the current economic development in China has encountered some difficulties and problems, which are problems in development and transformation and can be completely overcome with effort."

Topic 2 

Central Asia

In early July, President Xi Jinping embarked on a four-day visit to Central Asia. The main purpose of this trip was to attend the 24th summit of the Council of Heads of State of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) held in Astana, Kazakhstan's capital city, and to make state visits to Kazakhstan and Tajikistan. As might be expected, the visit received marquis treatment in China’s state media, with the People's Daily dedicating its entire front page over four consecutive days to covering the trip.

China's extensive coverage of Xi Jinping's Central Asian visit and attendance at the SCO summit in the People's Daily reflected a strategic focus on deepening ties in the region. The newspaper featured a detailed account of Xi's state visits to Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, framing the relationships in terms of "good neighbors, friends, partners, and brothers" (好邻居、好朋友、好伙伴、好兄弟) in both the domestic and overseas editions. This narrative was reinforced through articles on international responses to Xi’s overseas trip and his speech at the SCO+ summit, which laid heavy stress on the phrase "community of shared destiny" (人类命运共同体), a central phrase in Xi-era foreign policy [CMP Dictionary]. 

The same themes were emphasized again in an official commentary on July 1 by “He Yin” (和音), a pen name in the People's Daily for important commentaries on international affairs, which is a homophone for "Voice of Harmony." The commentary, called "Following the Trend of the Times, Promoting Peace and Development," emphasized the SCO as a "bridge of cooperation and bond of friendship" (合作桥梁、友好纽带), and it described China's vision of "peace, development, cooperation and win-win" as the "correct choice" (正确选择) for international society, to be based on "an equal and orderly multilateralism" (平等有序的世界多极化). For a more in-depth understanding of how China understands the seemingly self-evident term “multilateralism,” see the relevant entry at our partner project, Decoding China.  

The SCO summit received significant attention due to China’s role in the establishment of this Eurasian political, economic, and security organization. One week after the above commentary, another piece attributed to “He Yin” was essentially an effort to argue for the international influence and legitimacy of this organization. As one of the founders, China has the power to use this platform to advance China's regional interests and global influence — which is also about advancing China’s political discourse. This was readily visible in the language of the Astana Declaration adopted at the July meeting, which spoke of “creating conditions for stronger universal peace, security and stability, and for building a new democratic and fair political and economic world order.” The declaration, like many international statements put forth by China, speaks to the CCP’s ambition to shape international discourse and promote its vision of global governance, particularly around notions of state-centered development and non-interference over and above individual rights. 

Central Asia is a region China has made a strong focus of foreign policy since last year. In our report last May, we featured the inaugural China-Central Asia Summit, where visiting leaders from five Central Asian countries were treated to a lavish Tang-style ceremony in Xi’an. Over the past year, China’s outreach to the region has yielded notable results, particularly with Kazakhstan, where the Belt and Road Initiative was first proposed 11 years ago. Bilateral trade between China and Kazakhstan grew by 30 percent last year, reaching a record high of 41 billion dollars. Xi's visits to both Kazakhstan and Tajikistan included tours of China-related projects, emphasizing the tangible outcomes of these partnerships. Details are discussed in greater detail in the DIPLOMACY IN FOCUS section below. 

The importance of these relationships was prominently conveyed in the treatments of state media. The People's Daily published an exclusive interview with Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev on July 1, in which the leader described Kazakh-Chinese cooperation as "a model of interstate relations." The next day, further reinforcing the narrative of bilateral accord, a signed article from Xi Jinping appeared in Kazakh media, called "Working Together to Write a New Chapter in China-Kazakhstan Relations" (同心笃行  续写中哈关系新篇章). Additional interviews and articles from officials and experts endorsed the China-Kazakhstan and China-Tajikistan relationship. The People’s Daily ran another He Yin commentary titled "Drawing a New Blueprint for Cooperation, Writing a New Chapter of Friendship" (绘就合作新蓝图 续写友好新篇章) that lauded the diplomatic achievements in China-Kazakhstan relations in distinctly Chinese terms, speaking of a “China-Kazakh community of shared destiny” (中哈命运共同体), and the “magic formula of mutually beneficial and win-win cooperation" (互利共赢的合作法宝).

PROVINCES IN PRIME POSITION

The People's Daily often mirrors the focus areas of the central leadership, and provinces that align closely with national strategic objectives — such as those involved in major economic initiatives or showcasing successful implementation of party policies — tend to receive more prominent coverage in the newspaper. Similarly, domestic policies that support the goals, like poverty alleviation, technological innovation, or environmental protection, are frequently highlighted. Each month, we survey provinces in prime positions in the People’s Daily to determine how they are emphasized in the CCP’s official discourse. This can offer a view of how China is defining its priorities in domestic policies. 

How did provinces fare in the People’s Daily in July 2024? 

A Focus on High-Quality Development

In July, the “High-Quality Development Inspection Tour'' (高质量发展调研行) series of regional reports city in our June 2024 report continued. Six provinces and municipalities made the front page of the People’s Daily. Guangdong, Shanghai, Jiangsu, and Liaoning were named for technological innovation, while Shaanxi and Jiangxi were named for the “green economy” (绿色经济) and ecological protection.

Judging from the official discourse over the past three months, technological innovation is a central priority in current domestic policy. The CCP appears determined to mobilize resources to support technological innovation, and regions related to this priority are correspondingly highlighted. Part of this focus has been artificial intelligence, and the front page of the July 2 edition of the People’s Daily featured a report on the development of the AI industry in Shanghai. Progress on AI was linked to the pursuit of what China constantly calls “high-quality development” (高质量发展), a term that emerged at the 19th National Congress of the CCP in 2017 and rapidly accelerated in use in 2021. On the front page of the July 23 edition, Premier Li Qiang’s inspection trip to Tianjin was featured, in which he addressed the importance of creating a more effective science and innovation platform, as well as strengthening support for science and technology-based SMEs and incentives for researchers. Once again, the term “high-quality development” was emphasized, appearing in the headline, and repeatedly in the text itself. 

Disaster News and “Important Instructions” 

Flooding in many parts of China in July had catastrophic consequences, with Shaanxi and Hunan making the front page because of accidents caused by heavy rainfall and flooding. On the front page of the July 6 edition, a report noted that a breach had occurred in a dike at Dongting Lake in Hunan Province. A front-page report in the July 21 edition noted that a highway bridge had collapsed in Shaanxi Province’s Zhashui County, causing 12 deaths, with 31 people missing. 

These serious stories did not, mind you, receive serious coverage as news stories. As is typical in the People’s Daily, they were reported not with an attention to the details of suffering on the ground, or any semblance of human interest, but rather with an emphasis on the actions of the top leadership — sending the simple message that things were being done. In both cases, there were ”important instructions” (重要指示) from Xi Jinping, the highest level of attention — and one in the Xi era reserved entirely for the man at the top — as well as “written instructions” (批示) from Premier Li Qiang. For more on the history of “written instructions” within the CCP, see our related entry in the CMP Dictionary. 

UPS & DOWNS

Every month, we look at the terms in our discourse list that move substantially up and down the tiers of the CMP scale. For July 2024, the words heating up could be clustered into three themes: governance, Xi’s centrality, and security.

Governance

Due to the Third Plenum, many keywords related to reform and governance were significantly boosted. For example, the phrase “reform and opening” (改革开放) tripled in frequency of use, while “top-level design” (顶层设计) — referring broadly to the central leadership action to encourage practical exploration of policy responses to promote Chinese-style modernization  — and “deepening reform and opening” (深化改革开放) doubled in use. Terms related to reforms in specific areas were also boosted significantly, such as “economic system reforms” (经济体制改革) and “judicial system reforms” (司法体制改革).

Since the Third Plenum generally signals the direction of the party and the country, terms signaling visions and goals were also on the rise. “The national governance system and the modernization of governing capacity” (国家治理体系和治理能力现代化) rocketed to Tier 2, which indicates that the term is a leading agenda in the discourse. Similar terms to receive special emphasis in July included “comprehensively building a modern socialist nation” (全面建设社会主义现代化国家) and “comprehensive law-based governance” (全面依法治国). 

However, the goals state media focused more on this month were grand ones at the national level. Terms that touch on what you might call the populist appeal of CCP rule, like “common prosperity” (共同富裕), which is a buzzword under Xi for pushing general economic well-being and narrowing sharp gaps in wealth [CMP Dictionary], were sharply down. "Common prosperity" was at just half of its June level for the month of July 2024. 

Xi’s Centrality

The affirmation of Xi Jinping’s absolute centrality has been a recurring theme for 12 years, tending to rise around key political sessions. It was no surprise, then, that related terms recorded notable increases around the Third Plenum. In July 2024, the “Two Establishes” (两个确立), a crucial phrase signaling the legitimacy of Xi’s rule since November 2021 [CMP Dictionary], was significantly boosted. The term refers to 1) the establishment of Xi as the “core” of the CCP leadership, and 2) the establishment of Xi’s ideas as the bedrock of the future under what the party has termed the “New Era.” 

Along with the “Two Establishes,” there were three other phrases that increased noticeably in July. These were the “Four Consciousnesses” (四个意识), the “Four Confidences” (四个自信), and the “Two Upholds” (两个维护). Collectively known as the “442 formula” [CMP Dictionary], these three phrases have been essential to firming up Xi's position as the CCP’s “core” leader. The last of these, the “Two Upholds,” is about protecting both 1) Xi’s “core” status and 2) the authority and centralized leadership of the Party. The terms have more or less held steady in recent months, but in July they strengthened markedly. 

Security

Security has been a frequently occurring theme in the People’s Daily, and it received strong emphasis around the Third Plenum, as seen in the performance of several security-related terms. Reference to “national security (国家安全) nearly doubled in July, while “political security” (政治安全) also rose. These, particularly “national security” were associated closely with ongoing tensions with the United States and the West. 

Outside the political sphere, meanwhile, terms that warned of risks in the economy and finance, such as “financial risk” (金融风险) and “downward pressure” (下行压力), also performed better than seen in June. Terms implying international risks and external threats in the arena of finance and the economy, such as “unilateralism” (单边主义) and “protectionism” (保护主义), trended downward. 

Xi-deology Slips 

Looking at the various permutations of Xi Jinping’s powerful banner phrase for specific policy areas in July, the rule seems to be underperformance. The strongest member of the team, “Xi Jinping Thought on Ecological Civilization” (习近平生态文明思想) — Xi’s catchphrase for environmental policy and sustainable development — was boosted to Tier 3. Xi’s catchphrase for culture and ideology, “Xi Jinping Thought on Culture” (习近平文化思想), halved, placing it in Tier 4 with “Xi Jinping Thought on Rule of Law” (习近平法治思想). “Xi Jinping Thought on Economy” (习近平经济思想) also dropped by half to Tier 5, where it was joined by “Xi Jinping Thought on a Strong Military” (习近平强军思想), the general secretary’s signature national security phrase. The weakest of the group was still “Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy” (习近平外交思想), which remained in Tier 6. 

None of these permutations, variations of the banner phrase “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era” (习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想), has moved in a substantial way over the past several years. However, as we approach the midpoint in Xi’s third term, they are worth watching closely for signs of the shortening of the banner phrase — almost certainly a key discourse objective of Xi and his leading acolytes in the CCP. While we routinely talk in English outside China about “Xi Jinping Thought” when referring to Xi’s signature buzzword, this shortening has not actually been achieved in Chinese.  

THE CENTRAL LEADERBOARD

It should surprise no one that Xi Jinping was the clear front runner among central CCP leaders mentioned in the People’s Daily in July 2024. The general secretary was mentioned in 701 articles, slightly more than in June due to the Third Plenum. This placed him at the top of the CMP scale in Tier 1, where he has held strong for well over three years. He was far and away the most mentioned leader in the CCP’s Central Committee.  

Following Xi, China’s top diplomat as director of the Office of the Central Commission for Foreign Affairs, Wang Yi (王毅), and Premier Li Qiang (李强) both made solid presences in Tier 2 with 72 and 53 mentions. Over the past year or so, Wang and Li have been the frontrunners among central leaders excepting Xi, and the two have often alternated positions as the number two most mentioned officials. Which of these two leads generally signals in any given month whether state media have focused on diplomatic or domestic affairs. In July, despite the Third Plenum, diplomatic affairs was the actual highlight.

Wang accompanied Xi during meetings with 16 foreign leaders, attended seven diplomatic events, and went on state visits to two countries, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Wang met personally or made phone calls to a further 16 leaders and delegations, and attended six events. Since last year, China has shown greater ambition in exerting its influence in resolving international disputes. July seemed to be quite a fruitful month in this regard. On July 23, 14 Palestinian factions signed the Beijing Declaration, which aimed at ending division and strengthening Palestinian national unity, paving the way toward achieving peace in Israel and Palestine. The next day, Ukraine’s foreign minister, Dmytro Kuleba, held a meeting with Wang in Guangzhou. Kuleba is the highest ranking Ukrainian official to visit China since the war started in early 2022. In China’s readout, Wang emphasized a political settlement of the conflict, essentially repeating China’s talking points on Ukraine since December last year, when Beijing offered a “six-point consensus” alongside Brazil. In June this year, China claimed the consensus now has support from 45 countries. 

Towards the end of July 2024, Wang Yi attended both the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference with China and the 14th East Asia Summit Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Vientiane. In addition to promoting economic and trade co-operation between China and ASEAN states, another key focus of his speech was to win more support and allies in the region in the territorial disputes between China and ASEAN member states in the South China Sea. In Vientiane, Wang also met with U.S. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken. Wang pointed out that although the Chinese and US governments have maintained communication in different aspects and people-to-people contacts are increasing, the US has intensified its containment and suppression of China. Risks are accumulating and challenges are rising in China-US relations, he said.

Premier Li Qiang was mentioned in July for his involvement in both diplomatic and domestic affairs. Li met with six foreign leaders in Beijing, and also sent congratulatory messages to both the new British prime minister, Keir Starmer, and Ursula von der Leyen (on her re-election as President of the European Commission). But the focus of Li’s presence in July remained on domestic policy. At the beginning of the month, he traveled to Jiangxi province, where he investigated flood control, rescue and relief efforts. During the month, the premier also went on inspection trips to Jiangsu and Tianjin, during which he emphasized innovation and digital transformation (see our discussion of “high-level development” further up). These all reflected the new innovation-driven industrial policy mentioned in our report last month. The same policy was also in focus at the communique of the Third Plenum this month. In his speech at the opening ceremony of the 2024 World Artificial Intelligence Conference and High-Level Meeting on Global AI Governance, Li also addressed this point. The continued focus in July on industrial policy was in large part a response to current and pressing economic challenges for China. During the month, Li Qiang hosted a meeting of experts and entrepreneurs on the economic situation to discuss how to support innovation in policy, as mentioned above.

The biggest boost in the People’s Daily in July was for Secretary of the CCP Secretariat Cai Qi (蔡奇). In June, Cai was mentioned just three times. In July, however, he was mentioned in 37 articles in the newspaper, placing him in Tier 3. This boost was due mainly to his joining of Xi Jinping on state visits to Central Asian countries. In addition, Cai Qi addressed a mobilization meeting for the central lecture program promoting the ”spirit” of the Third Plenum. Joining Cai in Tier 3 was Wang Huning (王沪宁), chairman of the People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). Diplomatically, Wang traveled to Vietnam to serve as Xi's special representative to offer official condolences on the death of the Vietnamese politician and communist theorist Nguyen Phu Trong. 

On the domestic front, Wang embarked on an inspection trip to Ganzi and Aba in Sichuan province, where he emphasized the governance of Tibet, including policies related to religion and obligation to the nation. “The Tibetan Buddhist community should carry forward the tradition of patriotism and love for the religion,” Wang noted, “ingraining a sense of national consciousness, civic-mindedness and awareness of the rule of law, supporting the leadership of the CCP and the socialist system, and safeguarding the unity of the motherland and national unity.” Wang also attended a consultative conference on smoothing domestic circulation, a reference to ensuring a resilient economic system in the face of the potential for geopolitical isolation, a concern that has been evident since the talk during the pandemic of “domestic-international dual circulation” (国内国际双循环). 

The remaining members of the Politburo Standing Committee trailed in Tier 4 or below. Chairman of the NPC Standing Committee Zhao Leji (赵乐际), Vice Chairperson of the People's Political Consultative Conference Shi Taifeng (石泰峰), Vice Premier He Lifeng (何立峰), Vice Premier Zhang Guoqing (张国清), and Vice Premier Ding Xuexiang (丁薛祥) were all in Tier 4 in July 2024. Zhao was mentioned mainly for diplomatic engagements. He received visiting foreign leaders in Beijing and went on state visits to Uzbekistan and Russia. In Russia, Zhao attended the 10th BRICS Parliamentary Forum and the 9th meeting of the China-Russia Committee for Parliamentary Cooperation. Shi went on an inspection trip to Gansu, where he stressed policies on ethnicity and religion under the umbrella of the party’s United Front front (统一战线工作). The Xinhua readout for his visit was laden with official jargon on everything from the “442 formula,” again stressing Xi’s dominance, to the sinicization of religions (see note on Tibet above), “correct views of the history of the Chinese nation” (正确的中华民族历史观), and even national “discourse power.” But Shi was mentioned chiefly in July for his involvement in various efforts to promote foreign investment. 

Although not members of the Central Committee, two central leaders are worthy of note for their exposure in the People’s Daily in July 2024. They are Liu Jianchao (刘建超), the Chinese diplomat and head of the International Department of the Chinese Communist Party, and Wang Xiaohong (王小洪), the country’s minister of public security. Since last year, the two have maintained steady mentions for their engagement in both domestic and diplomatic events. In July, they were both placed in Tier 5. Liu met with nine foreign delegations in Beijing. Wang went on an inspection trip to Tianjin, where he addressed the grass-roots foundations of public security.

DIPLOMACY IN FOCUS

Each month we survey world leaders to determine how they are emphasized (or left out) in the CCP’s official discourse, which can offer a view of how China is defining its priorities in foreign relations. How did world leaders fare in the People’s Daily in July 2024? 

Tajik President Emomali Rahmon and Kazak President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev led the pack for the month, reflecting the above-mentioned focus on foreign policy in Central Asia. They both made solid presences in Tier 3. Their heavy coverage was due to Xi's attendance of SCO meetings and state visits to the two countries. While in Dushanbe, Rahmon was awarded China's Friendship Medal, the first medal as such, in honor of the ‘ironclad’ friendship between the two countries. Rahmon also attended the inauguration ceremony for new parliamentary and government buildings in Tajikistan, which were completed with assistance from China — a fitting symbol of China’s footprint in the region. In a joint statement released during Xi’s visit, the parties vowed to upgrade bilateral ties to a “comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership.” 

While in the Kazakh capital of Astana, Tokayev and Xi attended the inauguration of a joint cultural center for the two countries, as well as the opening of the Kazakhstan branch of Beijing Language and Culture University. Also inaugurated by video link was the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route — a key component of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) that runs from Southeast Asia and China through Kazakhstan, across the Caspian sea to Azerbaijan and Georgia, and further on to Europe. In the joint statement, the two parties vowed to build a new ”Golden Thirty Years” in the bilateral relationship, a reference to the past 32 years of formal relations. 

Russian President Vladimir Putin, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, Vanuatuan Prime Minister Charlot Salwai, and East Timorese Prime Minister Xanana Gusmão all made Tier 4 in July 2024, forming a second layer of global leaders receiving a medium level of attention for the month. 

Putin was mentioned in the context of several top-level exchanges between Russia and China. These included Xi‘s meeting with Putin in Astana during the SCO meetings. In addition to this exchange, during which the two sides spoke of "opposing external interference" (反对外部干涉) and "jointly maintaining peace and stability in the region" (共同维护本地区安宁稳定),  three Chinese central leaders — Zhang Guoqing, Zhao Leji, and Ding Xuexiang — visited Russia to promote bilateral cooperation in various fields. 

Meloni, Salwai, and Gusmão were mentioned for their visits to Beijing. Meloni, Italy’s prime minister, signed a three-year action plan on strengthening the comprehensive strategic partnership. The visit was the first to China by the leader since Italy withdrew from Xi Jinping’s signature BRI, an embarrassment about which Chinese state media were notably quiet at the time. During the July visit, every effort was made, apparently, to suggest the bilateral relations were back on track. For more on the Meloni visit, see CMP’s related analysis by researcher Dalia Parete, “When Meloni Met Xi.” One interesting detail we noted for that visit was that prime position in the People’s Daily was not given to Meloni the day after her arrival, which might have been expected, but rather to the visiting president of the small Southeast Asian nation of Timor-Leste (East Timor), whose GDP – and China cares about such things – is .06 percent that of Italy’s. This looked visually very much like a demotion of Italy’s stature, a tiny but significant act of revenge.

Salwai, the prime minister of Vanuatu, the South Pacific island nation, traveled to Beijing to attend the second high-level conference of the Forum on Global Action for Shared Development, part of Xi's Global Development Initiative (GDI). In a joint statement, the two sides vowed to deepen cooperation on climate change, island economies and maritime development. 

Gusmão was the first head of state of the Southeast Asian nation of Timor-Leste to pay a state visit to China since the country regained its independence in May 2002. The countries signed a joint statement on deepening their comprehensive strategic partnership, which includes, in addition to economic and trade cooperation, strengthening cooperation in areas such as police and law enforcement security. 

The foreign leaders making Tier 5 in July 2024, pointing to a low level of coverage in the People’s Daily, included Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, Former Vietnamese President Nguyen Phu Trong (who passed away on July 19), Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov, Prime Minister Jeremiah Manele of the Solomon Islands, and Bissau-Guinean President Umaro Sissoco Embaló. Mirziyoyev, Lukashenko and Japarov were mentioned mainly for SCO meetings in Astana. Hasina, Manele and Embaló were mentioned for their visits to Beijing. 

The passing in July of former Vietnamese President Nguyen Phu Trong, regarded as an “old friend” of the Chinese people — a title generally bestowed on those seen as distinguished by their level of solicitude toward China and its political positions and/or development — was highlighted in Chinese state media, appearing on the front page of the People’s Daily for three consecutive days. Xi Jinping offered his condolences at the Vietnamese Embassy in Beijing, and sent Wang Huning as his special representative to Hanoi. 

As we mentioned in our discussion of its “six point plan,” China has shown an interest in acting as a broker of peace over the war in Ukraine. In line with this ambition, Ukraine was mentioned in 22 separate reports and commentaries in the People’s Daily in July 2024. This included a pair of commentaries by “Zhong Sheng” (钟声), the official pen name for important messages on China’s foreign affairs. Both were sharply critical of NATO and the United States: “NATO’s Selling of ‘Security Anxiety’ Undermines World Peace” (贩卖“安全焦虑”的北约破坏世界和平) and “Using the Ukraine Crisis to Smear China is a Hypocritical Double Standard” (借乌克兰危机抹黑中国尽显虚伪双标). (For a related look at the development of anti-US political discourse in recent years, please see our new CMP Dictionary entry on the term “US-West.”) 

Despite the sharp uptick in coverage in the People’s Daily of Ukraine in July, which also brought a visit to Beijing by the country’s foreign minister — the highest-ranking official to visit since the outbreak of war in 2022 — Ukrainian President Zelensky was not mentioned at all in the newspaper. This strongly suggests what many might suspect, that China’s focus on Ukraine is largely tactical and rhetorical, more about China and its vision of itself in the world than about either the Ukrainian or the Russian people. 

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This newsletter is in development, with new sections planned for the future — including a monthly rundown of the top commentaries in the People’s Daily from central and provincial leaders as well as ministries. But we also need your feedback. If you have suggestions on how we can improve the CMP Discourse Tracker, please write directly to David Bandurski at david[at]chinamediaproject.org.