You may have noticed that Sinocism has not published the monthly discourse tracker from China Media Project (CMP) in several months. CMP has launched a new service on Substack and the monthly report is now part of that. They have let me share the first issue of the new version with you, and I encourage you to sign up for their service .

Bill

Dear Subscribers: 

After an absence of several months, we are pleased to re-introduce the China Media Project’s monthly discourse report, for which we previously partnered with the excellent Sinocism. Best viewed directly on your Substack, the report covers many of the key agendas highlighted in the Chinese Communist Party’s official People’s Daily newspaper. These discourse reports were first created in the 2010s by CMP founder Qian Gang (钱钢), a veteran journalist and former Southern Weekly managing editor who remains one of the world’s foremost experts on the often esoteric discourse of the CCP. 

Our early work on the keywords of the People’s Daily, which we sometimes called “the CMP method,” was dismissed by a handful of prickly China observers at the time as mere tea leaf reading. These days, efforts to “read” the CCP’s flagship newspaper are so numerous such endeavors need not be defended at all. However, some initial thoughts and explanations are in order. In the future, I promise you, this introductory letter will be brief. 

First, it is important to understand that the People’s Daily, which is published by the CCP’s Central Committee, is regimented in several ways that make it a valuable body of text through which to understand the agendas of China’s leadership. The paper is regimented in the sense that its structure is highly unchanged, comprising 20 pages Monday-Friday, and 8 pages on the weekend; and in the sense that the production of the paper is highly controlled by the leadership as a means of internal and external messaging. Even structurally, the paper is disciplined, and not prone to layout or visual surprises. 

Finally, the terms used within the paper are representative – in fact, the most representative outside of once-in-five-year political reports – of the CCP’s regimented political discourse, which in Chinese is referred to as tifa (提法). Tifa has been translated as “framing,” and this indeed is the effect. But the word refers also to the discrete and distinct terminologies of the party – its unique vocabularies, many passed down from Soviet times, and many invented and re-invented as the tapestry of party discourse is woven through the decades. I often think of tifa as interlocking Lego blocks. They have discrete sizes, and there are rules about how they can and cannot be snapped together or pulled apart. “Democracy” and “security” are not examples of tifa, and woe be to the researcher who imagines they are, and then counts them like so many broken blocks. “Whole-process people’s democracy” (全过程人民民主), by contrast, is a tifa. “National security with Chinese characteristics'' (中国特色国家安全) is a tifa.

These aspects of the People’s Daily and party discourse make the paper an excellent body of text through which to “read” the politics of the CCP by tracing the development – and even frequencies – of various tifa. Qian Gang used to tell me that the People’s Daily is “the party’s Bible,” and viewing the paper as scriptural is an apt metaphor for how the party operates, particularly at a time when Xi Jinping has cultivated an atmosphere of political religiosity. But cautions are in order. Many current efforts to “read” the People’s Daily (and now I am being the prickly one) confuse summary and translation, even machine translation, with reading. They treat CCP words as though leaders are simply saying things – so-and-so attended X meeting where they said Y. Such “readings” ignore the structure, context, and symbolic meaning of the party’s discourse. They crush and pile up the Legos. In many cases, they fog up what the party is already saying obscurely. 

The CMP Discourse Tracker is not a crystal ball. Nor does it “unlock” the People’s Daily. The report is our calm, considered, and unhurried look at the major trend lines we observe in tifa and other terms in the paper over each month, supported by our unique approach to scaling tifa frequencies using historical benchmarks. Along the way, we hope to offer in-depth definitions and histories of key terms, or tifa, as well as interesting and illuminating notes about the structure and logic of what remains an important, though mystifying, vehicle for communicating the leadership’s priorities. 

Enjoy. 

David L. Bandurski /CMP Director

Chu Yang / Editor, Discourse Tracker 

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TOPPING THE AGENDA

Topic 1 

Science, Technology and Innovation (STI)

In June 2024, as the Third Plenum approached with a hum of expectation and guesswork owing to an unprecedented nine-month delay, one key focus of state media coverage was industrial policy, seen as urgently needed to find new impetus for the slowing economy. One related phrase, “scientific and technological innovation” (科技创新), was mentioned 256 times for the month in the People’s Daily, rating it Tier 3 on the CMP’s 1-6 scale for keyword intensity (热度) in the CCP’s flagship newspaper (see below). Other keywords associated with the topic featured prominently on the front pages of 14 of the month’s 30 editions. These included “science and technology power” (科技强国), “science and technology modernization” (科技现代化), and “self-reliance and self-improvement in science and technology” (科技自立自强). 

On June 4, the People’s Daily prominently featured a congratulatory letter sent by Xi Jinping to the 30th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Academy of Engineering. Just over a week later, on June 13, a similar letter from Xi responding to a member of the Chinese Academy of Sciences again made the front page. Though the letter was meant to have a touch of the personal, signaling Xi’s full and direct support of those working at the forefront of sci-tech, it was also laden with political messaging, its talk of the “original mission” (初心使命) alluding to Xi’s 2016 phrase about “not forgetting the original intention” (不忘初心) [CMP Dictionary]. “I hope that you will adhere to the original mission, giving full play to our advantages,” he began. 

On June 25, nearly the entire space above the fold on the front page was devoted to Xi's presence at the National Sci-Tech Conference and other related events. The next day, the prominent position just below the masthead of the People’s Daily reported the return to earth of the Chang'e-6 lunar module, promoted with a bright red headline as a marquis achievement of China's science and technology development.

The National Sci-Tech Conference received strong coverage throughout the month. The day after the start of the conference, the People's Daily ran a long report building up Xi Jinping’s speech. Called, “Seizing the High Ground in Sci-Tech Competition and Future Development” (抢占科技竞争和未来发展制高点), it seemed to draw out a blueprint for science and technology development based on the “important speech” (重要讲话), emphasizing Xi’s inspirational leadership of related reforms. There were key references to the need for “self-reliance and self-improvement in sci-tech” (科技自立自强), ideas emphasized since mid-year 2021 amid efforts to address slowing economic growth in the face of greater wariness and pushback from the United States, the EU and other major economies; and to “deep convergence” (深度融合), in this context the idea that innovations and breakthroughs should be shared across sectors to stimulate “new forms of production capability” (新质生产力). Evident throughout was Xi’s talk of a “new national system” (新型举国体制), emphasizing the government’s leading role in what he characterized as reforms. 

The next day, Xi’s call to remake the national sci-tech system was promoted with a series of pieces from “this paper’s commentator” (本报评论员), marking them as important staff-written pieces representing the views of the senior leadership. Run over successive days, the commentaries elaborated Xi’s conference speech. They were as follows: 

The central leadership’s focus on science and technology, responding to the urgent need for new energy for the slowing economy, was mirrored in coverage in the People’s Daily of regional cases of development and innovation. Of the several provinces and cities featured on the front page in June 2024, most were related to regional economic development with a strong sci-tech emphasis – to be discussed further down.

Aside from the projecting of grand plans and success stories, however, there were hints of anxiety in the flagship paper over decoupling (a consistent issue of concern in recent months) and “chokeholds” (卡脖子). This, in fact, partly explained the emphasis in Xi’s speech on self-reliance. China’s leaders have been keenly aware of Russia’s difficulties stemming from its invasion of Ukraine and the resulting sanctions from the West, and this sensitivity has driven a push for sci-tech self-reliance, as China has railed against talk in the West of decoupling, branding this an American-built "protectionist alliance" (保护主义同盟).

The phrase “self-reliance and self-improvement in science and technology” (科技自立自强) was mentioned in 81 articles in June 2024, placing it toward the top of Tier 2, a strong showing indicating it is a leading agenda. Right around the National Sci-Tech Conference, both the People's Daily and the official Xinhua News Agency ran large features on self-reliance. The features were clear about China’s motivation for self-reliance, invoking the need to avoid dependencies and prepare for uncertainties.

Topic 2 

Red History

From June 17-19, China’s Central Military Commission (CMC), the country’s top governing body for national defense, held a Political Work Conference, the first of its kind in years. The event, which focused on the ideological ties binding the military to the CCP, was held in the former revolutionary base of Yan’an, a prefectural-level city in Shaanxi. 

On June 20, the event dominated the front page of the People’s Daily, the focus of the full-page story being Xi Jinping’s speech as chairman of the CMC, and his stress on “the political loyalty of the armed forces” (政治建军). 

One week after the Political Work Conference, Xinhua News Agency reported that China’s former defense minister, Li Shangfu (李尚福), who disappeared from public view last September and was removed without explanation two months later, had been formally expelled from the party for “serious violations of discipline.” The decision was announced alongside that of Li’s predecessor, Wei Fenghe (魏鳳和). Given the proximity of the Political Work Conference and the punishments meted out to these former top generals, it’s hard to escape the educated guess that the conference was intended in large part to send a stern message to high-ranking military officials about the need to abide by CCP discipline. 

For the nearest parallel to this framing of control and discipline of the military around the legacy of the CCP, we must reach back a full decade to the 2014 Political Work Conference, held that year in Gutian – like Yan'an, an iconic revolutionary landmark.

It was in Gutian in 1929 – during a session later known as the “Gutian Meeting” – that the principle of CCP control of the military was first set down. At the 2014 meeting, echoing the words of the statement emerging 85 years earlier from Gutian, Xi Jinping said bluntly, “The Party commands the gun” (党指挥枪). 

Xi Jinping’s direct use of this classic phrase from the playbook of the CCP’s deep past was one of many early signs of his eagerness to bring back political symbols from history and give them new life in present-day political discourse. The same motivation lay behind the choice this year of the old revolutionary base of Yan’an as the site of the Political Work Conference. During the meeting, Xi made a point of visiting historical sites with generals at his side, emphasizing the “Yan'an spirit” (延安精神). 

The same day, the space to the right of the masthead, the priority spot known as the “newspaper eye” (报眼), featured an article called “Learning Party History, Understanding Party Discipline” (学党史 明党纪). The article was about how CCP history can (and must) be used to instruct cadres on discipline and anti-corruption. It was part of a discipline related education campaign that kicked off in April and was scheduled to continue into July, right through the 103rd anniversary of the founding of the Party.

On June 30, another front-page article, this time from Xinhua, traced the CCP’s deep historical roots, treating party rule as an incontestable historical necessity in the run up to the 75th anniversary of the founding of the PRC, which comes in October. “We firmly believe that the Chinese Communist Party has led the people in creating magnificent feats through struggle, and that it can employ new great struggles to do new great things,” the article concluded. The headline was a telling cry for continued political legitimacy: “Ensuring that the Party Remains the Pioneer of the Times and the Backbone of the Nation” (确保党始终成为时代先锋、民族脊梁).

PROVINCES IN PRIME POSITION

Six provinces and municipalities appeared on the front page of the People’s Daily in June 2024. Of these, three benefitted from the focus on science and technology, trotted out as STI models, while two took center stage as Xi Jinping made official tours.

Sichuan, Shanghai and Hubei were featured under the hot topic of the month, science and technology innovation. All of these provinces and municipalities were showcased as powering regional economic development through STI initiatives. Coverage of Sichuan province linked progress there to “development of the Western regions” (西部大开发), a policy priority mapped out beginning in the early 2000s and taking three phases through to 2050, by which leaders say the country’s historically laggard Western provinces will achieve “comprehensive modernization.” STI is now seen as critical to this process. The same is true for Hubei province in the context of the rise of central China, a theme as it received attention in the newspaper. In the case of Shanghai, the city was characterized as a leader in STI that could strengthen China's global influence.  

On his way back to Beijing following his meeting in Yan'an, Xi visited Qinghai and Ningxia. Both took up a full page of the front page on the 21st and 22nd. In both cases, the same theme, ecological protection, was repeated in the headlines.

The photographs accompanying the Qinghai article were taken at an ethnic minority high school and at Hongjue Temple, an historical Tibetan Buddhist temple. Together, they were meant to signal ethnic unity and religious plurality. Xi's talking points in the article also centered largely on ethnic and religious policies:

In the wake of Xi’s Qinghai and Ningxia trips, the People’s Daily ran a large article that made the implications of the tour far more explicit. “Fifty-Six Ethnic Groups Consolidated Together is the Chinese National Community,” read the headline.

Additionally, the People's Daily ran a series of 13 regional reports under the title “High Quality Development Inspection Tour'' (高质量发展调研行), which collectively dealt with various facets of China’s current economic development vision. Reports in this special series focused on Shanghai (3), Jiangsu (3), Liaoning (2) and Shaanxi (1). Playing to regional strengths and priorities, the Shanghai articles focused on the service sector and the development of core technology; the Jiangsu articles highlighted innovations in manufacturing; and the Shaanxi article addressed ecological development in Fuping County, where in recent years, the local government has worked to manage the Shichuan River and its tributaries, building wetland parks. It is worth noting that ecological projects like this at the local level have also in recent months been associated with waste — as CMP documented in a report on cultural promotion back in May.  

In keeping with Liaoning’s long-standing reputation as China’s aging rust belt, the two articles about the province focused on the reform of state-owned enterprises and industrial rejuvenation. 

UPS & DOWNS

Every month, we look at the terms in our discourse list that move substantially up and down the tiers of the CMP scale. For June 2023, the words heating up could be clustered into three themes: populism, industrial policy, and party discipline.

Signaling Legitimacy

With the approach of the 103rd anniversary of the founding of the CCP, June was a time to emphasize the importance of maintaining the party's superior status and preserving its leading role. One important theme, therefore, was the supposed popularity of the party’s rule, and it’s fundamental groundedness in the interests of the people — the reason for the CCP’s necessity. Terms in this vein included “common prosperity” (共同富裕) [CMP Dictionary], “the Chinese Dream” (中国梦), and “people as the core” (以人民为中心), which were all boosted for the month. 

Another key theme ahead of the party’s 103rd anniversary, as mentioned in the section above on the rule of the military, was discipline within the CCP, also regarded as essential to legitimacy. The stress placed on discipline led to stronger performance for terms associated with “party discipline” in June. These terms included “comprehensive strict governance of the Party” (全面从严治党), “self-revolution” (自我革命) — the dubious claim that the party’s strength lies in its ability to remake itself, without public scrutiny — “institutional advantages” (制度优势), and the “eight-point decision” (八项规定), a formula for defining disciplinary do’s and don’ts. Another strong performer was the “Four Malfeasances” (四风), a short list of dangers, including bureaucratism and formalism.

Lastly, terms associated with science and technology innovation were also on the rise, for the reasons discussed earlier in this report. One such term was “independent innovation” (自主创新) — just as it sounds, a claim to the invention and application of technology free from the constraints of global competitors. 

Tension Terms Reigned In 

One clear characteristic in the People’s Daily discourse in May this year was the deployment of words signaling toughness over the issue of Taiwan and non-interference, that pillar of Chinese foreign policy. But these terms moderated significantly in June. 

The swearing in in May of Taiwan’s newly-elected president, Lai Ching-te, brought the escalation of tensions across the strait. Intensified PRC military maneuvers around Taiwan were the symbolic punishment meted out by China’s leadership, and this was accompanied by an increase in antagonistic official chatter about Taiwan and Lai’s Democratic Progressive Party. As China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and state media telegraphed China’s official position in fierce language, terms related to Taiwan were boosted significantly. These included the “One China policy” (一个中国), which leapt into Tier 2 of CMP scale. Also performing strongly or terms attacking the United States, including “hegemonism” (霸权主义) “decoupling” (脱钩) and “external forces” (外部势力) — this last term being a staple in discourse blaming foreign governments for interference in China’s affairs. 

Some observers saw in China’s language a real escalation of tensions, possibly signaling the approach of war. A look at the June discourse in the People’s Daily suggests instead that this was a short-lived reaction. These terms were eased out in June. Among them, “One China policy” (一个中国) dropped by half. The same was true of language targeting the US.

Xi-deology Slips 

Looking at the various permutations of Xi Jinping’s powerful banner phrase for specific policy areas in June, the rule seems to be underperformance. The strongest team member, Xi’s catchphrase for culture and ideology, “Xi Jinping Thought on Culture” (习近平文化思想), remained in Tier 3, suggesting it has a central role in the party’s discourse. It was followed in Tier 4 by “Xi Jinping Thought on Economy” (习近平经济思想), which edged up, likely a reflection of intensified talk of economic and trade issues in the run up to the Third Plenum. 

Though also remaining in Tier 4, several other banner permutations slid downhill. These were “Xi Jinping Thought on Ecological Civilization” (习近平生态文明思想), Xi’s catchphrase for environmental policy and sustainable development, and “Xi Jinping Thought on Rule of Law” (习近平法治思想). Not surprisingly, given the important meeting of the Central Military Commission, “Xi Jinping Thought on a Strong Military” (习近平强军思想), the general secretary’s signature national security phrase, was boosted into Tier 5 — a slight improvement on its typically weak performance among banner permutations. The weakest of the group was “Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy” (习近平外交思想), which dropped one level to Tier 6.

THE CENTRAL LEADERBOARD

It should surprise no one that Xi Jinping was the clear front runner among central CCP leaders mentioned in the People’s Daily in June. The general secretary was mentioned in 630 articles, nearly level with the previous month. This placed him at the top of the CMP scale in Tier 1, where he has held strong for well over three years. He was far and away the most mentioned leader in the CCP’s Central Committee. 

Following Xi, Premier Li Qiang (李强) was the only central leader achieving a solid presence in Tier 2 with 74 mentions. It is notable, however, that we now consistently see a leader in Tier 2, which has not generally been the case over the past two years, during which Tier 2 has been a vacuum symbolizing Xi’s overwhelming domination. 

Last month, China’s top diplomat as director of the Office of the Central Commission for Foreign Affairs, Wang Yi (王毅), also made Tier 2, having an exceptionally strong performance due to rankling Taiwan issues. This month, however, Wang dropped to Tier 3, with only half the mentions of the previous month. This was also likely a reflection of a turn toward domestic affairs over foreign relations. Wang Yi was also the only central leader in Tier 3, most remaining members of the Politburo Standing Committee trailing in Tier 4 or below. 

Li Qiang was mentioned for his involvement in both diplomatic and domestic affairs. Li met with and had phone calls with seven foreign leaders in Beijing. He also made state visits to New Zealand, Australia and Malaysia between June 13 and 20. His visits had heavy coverage in the People's Daily. In addition to holding intergovernmental meetings, Li also met with business representatives and Chinese expats. The message he tried to convey was clear: deepening economic relations and China’s openness to foreign investment. He sought to reassure foreign companies by emphasizing what the leadership has called a “comprehensive deepening of reforms,” and emphasizing the country’s commitment to openness. On June 25, Li attended the opening ceremony of the Summer Davos on the theme ”New Frontiers for Future Growth,” and delivered a speech in which he mainly repeated last year's talking points on building an open world economy and opposing “decoupling.”

Wang Yi accompanied Xi during meetings with seven leaders, and Wang himself met with or called 13 leaders and delegations. When meeting with Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, Wang reiterated China’s position on a political settlement of the war in Ukraine, which China has insisted on referring to as “the Ukraine crisis.” China’s position was packaged as the Six-Point Consensus (六点共识), China’s alternative peace plan jointly issued by China and Brazil on May 23, 2024 – and seen by many international diplomats as a “subtle boycott” of a meeting of more than 90 nations led by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy. 

On June 21, Wang Yi attended the First Plenary Session of the Intergovernmental Committee between China and Nigeria, and held talks with the Nigerian foreign minister. The two sides released a joint statement in which China vowed to support the peace and security in the Sahel, the biogeographical region crossing north-central Africa that has been a focus of conflicts and tensions, and to support Nigeria in its efforts to upgrade its military and intelligence capabilities. The two sides agreed to strengthen exchanges and cooperation in the areas of military security, the military industry, and trade, as well as facilitating closer exchange between its police and law enforcement.

Chairman of the NPC Standing Committee Zhao Leji (赵乐际), Chairman of the People's Political Consultative Conference Wang Huning (王沪宁), Vice-Premier Ding Xuexiang (丁薛祥), and Vice Chairperson of the People's Political Consultative Conference Shi Taifeng (石泰峰) were all in Tier 4 in June 2024.

Zhao Leji was mentioned in updates in the People’s Daily on his work at the National People’s Congress, and in relation to various diplomatic engagements. The NPC chairman met with six visiting foreign leaders. Zhao also made an inspection tour of Hebei province, where he emphasized what were characterized as innovations in the work of the NPC as an ostensibly representative body. The focus in this context was on “whole-process people's democracy” (全过程人民民主) [CMP Dictionary], a term first raised by president Xi in 2019 in Shanghai as a new way of repackaging what he characterized as a form of democracy (yes, under one-party rule) that he insists is superior to systems in the West.  

Vice-Premier Ding Xuexiang made a relatively strong performance in June 2024, appearing six times on the front page of the People’s Daily. This was due mainly to heavy coverage of industrial policy and STI. Roughly even with Ding for the month, Wang Huning was highlighted for his attendance of the 16th Straits Forum on June 16, a PRC-hosted event in Fujian province that has limited participation by Taiwanese but is upheld by China as a crucial forum. As the event kicked off in Xiamen, Wang delivered a speech stressing the Party's overall strategy for resolving the Taiwan issue, but there was in fact little of substance beyond the repetition of familiar talking points.

Li Xi (李希), the secretary of the CCP Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, languished down in Tier 5 with just five articles mentioning him for the month. However, he appeared on the front page three times, two of which were related to his receiving a visiting Cuban delegation, to which he introduced China's experience of party governance. This was foreign relations coverage that had clear domestic implications, as outlined above. Li Xi also made an inspection tour to Sichuan, emphasizing the implementation of an education campaign for Party discipline. 

The biggest drop this month was for Secretary of the CCP Secretariat Cai Qi (蔡奇). In May, he made Tier 3 with 39 mentions. In June, however, he was mentioned just three times. 

Although not members of the Central Committee, two central leaders had noteworthy showings in June 2024. These were Liu Jianchao (刘建超), a Chinese diplomat and head of the International Department of the CCP, and Wang Xiaohong (王小洪), the minister of public security. Since last year, the two have maintained a steady presence in the People’s Daily for their engagement in both domestic and diplomatic events. In June, Liu visited three countries and met with four foreign delegations. During inspection trips to Beijing and Hubei, Wang Xiaohong emphasized drug control on the occasion of International Day Against Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking. Wang also discussed international cooperation in combating transnational crime with Malaysian and US counterparts, including a meeting in Vienna with the head of the US Department of Homeland Security, Alejandro Mayorkas.

DIPLOMACY IN FOCUS

Each month we survey world leaders to determine how they are emphasized (or left out) in the CCP’s official discourse, which can offer a view of how China is defining its priorities in foreign relations. How did world leaders fare in the People’s Daily in June 2024? 

Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim was the most mentioned foreign leader of the month with 15 mentions. He was mentioned mainly due to the occasion of 50 years of diplomatic relations between China and Malaysia.China Daily published an article on this occasion, Malaysia-China relations: An exemplar for ASEAN countries, which likely explained the heavy coverage. A series of diplomatic commemorative events were held. Chinese Premier Li Qiang and Anwar exchanged congratulatory letters, and Li paid a state visit to Malaysia.

During the visit, they attended a luncheon with business representatives from both countries, and the two parties followed with the release of the “Joint Statement Between the People's Republic of China and Malaysia on Deepening the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership towards China-Malaysia Community with a Shared Future,” in which much of the wording following official PRC language, including the reference to a “shared future,” a clipped version of a phrase that has become core to Xi era foreign policy: “A Community of Common Destiny for Mankind” [CMP Dictionary]. While it seems to appeal to a set of shared values and goals as the core of international relations – and resembles, for example, ideas at the heart of the formation of the European Union – the phrase incorporates traditional elements of Chinese foreign policy that prioritize a state-centered approach to human rights, while subordinating individual rights to the basic question of national interest. Despite the heavy hand of the Chinese side in the text, experts on China-Malaysia relations interpreted Malaysia’s actions as “dancing with (but not tilting to) China.”

Following Anwar, Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, Polish President Andrzej Duda, Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and New Zealand Prime Minister Christopher Luxon were all placed in the bottom end of Tier 4 with between 8 and 10 appearances. Shehbaz Sharif was mentioned for his state visit to China. Judging from the joint statement released, the main agenda of his trip was to push the 62 billion dollar China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a infrastructure network incorporating a port, power plants and road networks across Pakistan. The project was formally launched in 2015, and was seen as the main plank of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). However, the implementation has not been plain sailing. Since 2018, attacks on Chinese projects have been sporadic. Early this year, an attack that targeted the Dasu Hydropower Project caused the deaths of five Chinese workers, which was also addressed in the joint statement. It seemed quite clear that the newly-elected Shehbaz Sharif was determined in Beijing to negotiate more foreign investment and boost exports amid a flagging economy at home.  

Polish President Andrzej Duda was mentioned for his state visit to China and attendance at the Summer Davos. During his visit with Xi, the two sides reportedly discussed a peace solution for Ukraine. Albanese of Australia and Luxon of New Zealand were mentioned for Premier Li Qiang’s visits to their countries. Over the past few years, China-Australia relations have had a bumpy ride, strained due concerns on the Australian side over China’s human rights violations and its efforts at regional influence. Last November, Albanese visited Beijing, the first such trip in seven years. Since then, bilateral relations have eased significantly. Premier Li’s visit signaled a further stabilization of relations.

Tunisian President Kais Saied, who came to Beijing with the Tunisian delegation for the 10th Ministerial Conference of the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum made Tier 5 with just five articles for the month. But even more fruitful from China’s perspective was the Forum, which adopted three “outcome documents.” These included the Beijing Declaration, which reaffirmed “mutual support on core interest issues and deepening practical cooperation” between China and Arab states. The document again referenced China’s core diplomatic concepts, characterizing the results of the forum as the “establishment of a China-Arab Community of common destiny.”

In addition to an implementation plan on multilateral and bilateral cooperation in trade, investment and politics, the forum signed a joint statement expressing "grave concern" over the ongoing crisis in Gaza. Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov was also in Tier 5, with the same number of articles. He was mentioned in the context of the long planned China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Railway, an agreement for which was finally signed this month, with a planned start in October. The project, in planning for years, has been mired in questions about financing. These difficulties were reportedly ironed out in June, but none of the three countries involved has so far published specifics about the three-nation consortium behind the deal, or how financing has been arranged. 

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This newsletter is in development, with new sections sections planned for the future — including a monthly rundown of the top commentaries in the People’s Daily from central and provincial leaders as well as ministries. But we also need your feedback. If you have suggestions on how we can improve the CMP Discourse Tracker, please write directly to David Bandurski at david[at]chinamediaproject.org.